We meld two traditional approaches to managing a valued resource. The first is restoring its quality. The second is curbing its rate of deterioration. Although both approaches are widely used in real world settings, analytic models to date have not combined the two strategies.
Introduction
This paper considers the problem of managing a valued resource in a dynamic setting. We meld two traditional approaches to promoting quality. The first entails restoring the quality of the resource. The second involves curbing its deterioration.
For example, human actions over several decades have degraded natural habitat in the Florida Everglades. Restoration would involve a large-scale project to reroute water flows and reintroduce native species, while reducing pollution would slow the rate at which degradation continues. The management of groundwater aquifers offers another instance: an aquifer can be recharged when depleted, while conservation measures can slow the rate at which it is drawn down. Populations of endangered species such as the California condor can be replenished through captive breeding programs; their rate of decline can be slowed by other efforts aimed to reduce mortality risks or habitat loss.
Similar dynamics play out in the management of physical and human capital. The quality of an existing machine diminishes as it deteriorates and becomes obsolete. Investment in new capital restores the stock; maintenance slows depreciation. A firm may see human capital in much the same fashion. An engineer whose skills have become obsolete can be "traded in" through dismissal or downsizing; that "trade-in" can be delayed through maintenance efforts, such as continued job training.
In each of these settings, two distinct approaches are available to manage the quality of the resource: boosting the resource stock and slowing the rate at which it deteriorates. Hence both stocks and flows can be controlled to promote quality. We refer to this class of problems as "SFQ" problems. In this paper, we develop a general model of the optimal management of a resource stock when flows are controllable and restoration is feasible. The optimal policy employs both strategies, and neither strategy takes the form it would in the absence of the other. The availability of abatement changes the quality level that triggers restoration of the resource, while the feasibility of restoration reduces the optimal rate of abatement. The optimal policy calibrates the use of these two instruments. If restoration is sufficiently costly, and offsetting the flow inexpensive, optimal abatement may rise high enough to offset the expected deterioration and produce an equilibrium in expectation. Even so, restoration remains an option if unexpected shocks reduce the stock of quality sufficiently. When deterioration is more rapid or more variable, or when restoration is less costly, the optimal policy relies more on restoration.
To fix ideas, consider automobile ownership. The rate at which a car deteriorates -and hence how soon it must be replaced -can be slowed by regular maintenance. Eventually, an automobile wears out and is replaced with another: in our terms, the quality of the valued resource (transportation services) is restored. If buying a new car were impossible, the optimal policy would maintain the car's quality at the steady state where the marginal cost of maintenance equals its marginal benefit. The feasibility of replacement alters that calculus. Over the life of the car, optimal maintenance varies. Early on, it may increase: the car is still valuable but requires increasing attention. Toward the end of the car's life, however, optimal maintenance declines, since the future benefits of maintenance diminish. A driver on the way to the junkyard to scrap her car is unlikely to stop for an oil change.
The possibility of restoration significantly affects the optimal management of a resource. Consider the case of a pollutant that accumulates in the environment. In the well-behaved world of economics textbooks, the marginal benefit and cost curves of reducing pollution depend only on current quality, and they slope, respectively, down and up. Given this, the optimal policy equates the marginal benefit of reducing pollution, adjusted for the discount rate and the decay rate of the stock, to the marginal cost of abating it. A steady state is reached in which optimal abatement efforts just keep up with net new accumulation.
Restoration efforts, in contrast, capitalize on economies of scale. Given such a nonconvexity, optimal cleanup may proceed in a jerky fashion. For example, one way to clean up a hazardous waste site is to haul the soil away and incinerate it, in which case the costs vary little with the initial concentration of the contaminant in the soil. Even on sites where pollution is continuing, such cleanup should only be done periodically, and quality allowed to diminish in the meantime. Similarly, there are high fixed costs involved in restoring an endangered species such as the California condor or refilling a depleted groundwater aquifer. In the car-care example above, the cost of replacement is driven primarily by the quality of the new car, not of the old. The source of the nonconvexity can also be institutional. For example, establishing a regulatory regime, such as a ban on fishing in Georges Bank, may entail significant political costs. This model has broad relevance for the management of resource stocks in the real world. We have already noted three in the environmental arena: natural habitats such as the Florida Everglades, groundwater aquifers, and endangered species recovery. Other environmental SFQ problems include the management of municipal solid wastes at landfills and hazardous waste at laboratories; the siltation of reservoirs and harbors; the decline in farmland fertility from topsoil erosion; and the salination of agricultural areas. Further afield, our model could be applied to the control of pests, from aphids to zebra mussels.
Our analysis generalizes readily to the management of physical and human capital. The SFQ model can illuminate the optimal trade-off between maintaining physical capital (such as assemblyline equipment or a fleet of airplanes) and replacing it. It can also be used to analyze the problem of combatting terrorism (Keohane and Zeckhauser 2003) . A unique SFQ problem is the protection of Venice from rising seas. Here abatement consists of laying down boardwalks during the periodic acque alte and bolstering existing infrastructure to protect against rot, while the ambitious plans to control the flow of water into the lagoon represent restoration.
Our focus on the interplay between abatement and restoration is novel. Although both stock and flow controls are widely used in real world settings, analytic models tend to focus on one strategy or the other. The literature on the economics of controlling stock pollutants, for example, has focused on reducing the flow of emissions. Theoretical models generally assume strict convexity in abatement costs, leading to steady-state interior solutions in which the flow of new pollution just offsets the natural decay of accumulated pollution (Falk and Mendelsohn 1993; Keeler, Spence, and Zeckhauser 1971; Plourde 1972; Plourde and Yeung 1989; Smith 1972 ). The steady-state solution is found by equating the marginal cost of abatement with the present-value marginal benefit of pollution reduction.
Other analyses deal only with cleaning up an accumulated stock of pollution -what we call restoration. Caputo and Wilen (1995) assume that cleanup costs are convex. As a result, the optimal solution stops short of complete cleanup (they let natural degradation finish the process), as long as when pollution approaches zero so does its marginal damage. Phillips and Zeckhauser (1998) argue that cleanup costs are often "destination-driven," depending on the ultimate level of environmental quality, rather than the initial level (or the amount of cleanup needed). While they thus assume economies of scale, however, they treat the restoration problem in a static, onetime-only setting. Moreover, they consider only the polar case in which all cleanup costs are destination-driven: in our terms, only restoration is possible.
In our model, of course, the "stock" is a good (resource quality) rather than a bad (pollution); but that is only a difference in sign. The important distinction is that we consider controls on both stocks and flows. Our model also diverges from the previous literature on stock pollutants by introducing uncertainty into the path of the resource over time. An important consequence for optimal policies is that no true steady-state exists. Even if an equilibrium exists in expectation, a large flow of damages could still drive quality down far enough to trigger restoration. In turn, the possibility of eventual restoration lessens the incentive to abate at each level of quality.
Our dynamic-programming approach also has deep roots in the optimal control literature -in particular, the well-known (S,s) model of inventory control (Arrow, Harris, and Marschak 1951; Scarf 1960 ). Nevertheless, in that literature as well, our combination of stock and flow control is a novel innovation. 1 The next section introduces the basic model, and formally defines our notions of abatement and restoration. Section 3 develops the theoretical results. Section 4 illustrates these results with examples of real-world SFQ problems in the environmental arena. We focus in particular on the recovery of the California condor, and then turn briefly to several other examples. Section 5 suggests how our model can be applied to the management of physical and human capital, and details the model's application to the problem of optimal maintenance and replacement of a machine. Section 6 concludes.
Model framework
In this section, we construct a model of environmental degradation and amelioration that allows us to analyze optimal abatement and restoration policies. At this level of abstraction, we have in mind a generalized environmental resource with a "quality" level that changes over time. In the case of accumulating waste, for example, the quality might be measured by the volume of waste: the smaller the amount, the higher the level of environmental quality. 2 To keep things simple, we assume that there is a "manager" of the resource, who determines abatement and restoration policies and carries them out. 3 We represent the quality of the environmental resource at time t by a real number x t . Larger values of x t represent more desirable states. We normalize the initial quality level to be equal to zero, so that x 0 = 0, and we shall be working mostly with negative values for x. 4 In addition to any efforts of the resource manager, two processes acting in opposite directions affect the level of environmental quality: ongoing damage to the resource and natural recovery processes, such as the decay of the accumulated pollutants. To capture both effects, we model the deterioration of the resource as a random variable with drift. Cumulative deterioration up to time t, denoted by z t , is assumed to follow a Brownian motion with drift rate µ > 0, variance rate σ 2 , and z 0 = 0. Hence, deterioration evolves according to
1 The model of Balcer (1973) is an exception to the general focus on stock (inventory) controls. He introduces advertising (positively affecting consumer demand) into the traditional optimal inventory problem. Hence advertising is a form of flow control, and its level must be considered jointly with the selection of the (S, s) bounds.
2 Note that we use "quality" to denote the state of the resource: for example, it may measure how much pollution has accumulated. How the quality of a resource is valued will be captured in the utility function.
3 The manager could be the administrator of a regulatory agency (e.g., EPA) that issues rules or provides rewards to influence the behavior of the firms that directly affect the resource. In this paper we assume that suitable instruments are available to the manager to ensure that her aims are met. We leave the determination of the form of those instruments to future research. 4 The normalization of the starting point to zero simplifies notation. A reader uncomfortable with negative values for "quality" may shift the x-axis by any constant amount.
where w t follows a standard Brownian motion. Intuitively, µ can be thought of as the "average" rate of deterioration of the resource: for example, the average flow of pollution minus the natural decay of existing pollution. The random term in equation (1) captures random variations in the processes of damage and natural recovery. Unless the manager curbs the rate of deterioration or restores the resource, quality at time t is x t = −µt + σw t .
Assumptions on utility and cost functions
We assume that society's benefit from the resource at any point in time depends only on the level of environmental quality. Thus, at time t society derives a flow of utility u(x t ) from the availability of the resource. 5 We assume that the social rate of time preference is α > 0. We further assume that the utility function has the following properties.
Assumption 1
The utility function u is twice continuously differentiable, with u < 0, u 0 > 0, u 00 < 0, and u 0 unbounded above. Furthermore, E x £R ∞ t=0 e −αt u(x t )dt ¤ is finite for all x, where E x denotes the expectation conditional on an initial state x.
Note that utility takes negative values; the utility function can be thought of as the negative of a convex loss function. The assumption of negative utility is made for notational convenience and has no bearing on our results. 6 We define abatement as a reduction in the rate of deterioration. Abating at rate a slows the expected deterioration rate from µ to µ − a. We assume that the resource manager faces the classic trade-off between the benefits of higher environmental quality and the costs of achieving it.
Assumption 2
The abatement cost function c : [0, ∞) is twice continuously differentiable with c ≥ 0, c(0) = 0, and c 00 ≥ ² for some ² > 0.
In our SFQ framework, abatement corresponds to flow control. In the context of pollution control, for example, end-of-pipe controls on emissions and changes in the production process that reduce pollution are both forms of abatement. We assume that a finite maximum feasible rate of abatement exists, denotedā. 7 This ceiling may be higher than the mean flow rate µ. Hence our 5 We ignore issues such as population growth or changes in income, which could make the utility function timedependent. With a growing population, for example, one might scale the utility function to the size of the population, so that the absolute value of the (negative) utility associated with a given level of environmental damage (negative quality) would increase over time. If abatement costs remained constant, the optimal level of abatement at a given level of environmental quality would increase over time. On the other hand, we might expect that abatement costs and the drift rate µ might be greater for a larger population producing more waste. 6 A reader uncomfortable with negative utility may add any constant term she wishes to make utility positive over its relevant range, without affecting the results. 7 The assumption of a ceiling on abatement is innocuous: the ceiling can always be set high enough that the probability it binds is vanishingly small. We include it to provide a measure of generality. In some cases of interest, the manager may have limited abilities to stem or particularly to reverse the flow of deterioration.
The assumption also simplifies the proof that an optimal abatement policy exists. However, for the problem considered here, an optimal abatement policy can be shown to exist even if we allow abatement to be unbounded. In the abate-only case, the concavity of the value function and the convexity of the abatement cost function are sufficient to ensure that infinite abatement will never be optimal. In the abate-and-restore case, in which the value function is convex over part of its range, it is also possible (but more complicated) to show that the second derivative of the abatement cost function is greater than the second derivative of the value function, at least for sufficiently high rates of abatement. This rules out the possibility of infinite abatement being optimal in the abate-and-restore case as well.
model allows the resource manager not only to offset actual flows fully but to reverse the flow to some extent. In such a case, "abatement" results in a positive rate of change in the quality of the resource. Crucially, the costs of such cleanup are increasing on the margin.
Restoration corresponds to a discrete improvement in environmental quality -affecting the stock directly, rather than by slowing deterioration. In particular, from any state x t , we assume that the manager can restore the resource to the state x = 0. 8 Our notion of restoration embodies economies of scale. In our analysis, we assume an extreme form of nonconvexity: a positive fixed cost of restoration and zero marginal costs. Thus the cost of restoration is "destination-driven."
Assumption 3 The cost of restoring quality from any state x t to x = 0 is independent of x t and is given by C > 0.
The fundamental results of the model hold under less rigid forms of scale economies, as we explain in Section 3.2.4.
Abatement and restoration policies
We shall restrict our attention to optimal stationary policies -policies that are functions of the state x. This assumption simplifies the analysis and has little practical impact. 9 An abatement policy is a mapping a : < 7 → [0, a] from the set of real numbers (the possible values of the state x) to the interval [0,ā] (the feasible levels of abatement). Thus an abatement policy specifies the abatement level as a function of the state x. A restoration policy is characterized by a measurable closed subset R of <. Under a restoration policy R, restoration occurs whenever the state x t occupies the set R.
Given a combined abatement-restoration policy (a, R), the state of the resource evolves according to x t = R t s=0 (a(x s ) − µ)ds + σw t − P {i|τ i <t} x τ i , where τ i is the time at which the ith restoration occurs. Hence starting from an initial state x, the infinite-horizon expected discounted utility can be written as
The manager's objective is to choose a combined abatement-restoration policy that maximizes this expectation simultaneously for all x.
Optimal policies for SFQ problems
In this section we analyze optimal policies for general SFQ problems. We first characterize the optimal restoration and abatement policies and show how the feasibility of one clean-up method 8 A more general framework would explicitly model the manager's choice of how much to restore -that is, how far to clean up the resource. For example, there might be more than one possible restoration method; or the costs of restoration could rise steeply as some very high level of quality was approached. But in general, such a problem will yield a single optimal destination, so little is lost by our assumption of one restoration technology. Our choice of x = 0 as the destination, meanwhile, is merely a normalization and does not affect the results. 9 An alternative approach would be to make the manager's problem one of choosing an optimal stochastic process {a t } measurable with respect to the filtration generated by {w t }. However, one can show that such an optimal process can be produced by letting at = a(xt). Thus our assumption that the manager chooses the best among the set of stationary policies does not affect the practical implications of the analysis.
affects the optimal use of the other. We then consider how the optimal policies vary with the mean flow rate µ, the variability of the flow σ 2 , and the costs of restoration and abatement.
Optimal restoration and abatement
We use stochastic dynamic programming to characterize the optimal restoration and abatement policies. Let J be the optimal value function:
where the supremum is taken over pairs of abatement and restoration policies. J(x) represents the maximal present value of the future stream of net benefits (utility minus cost) under the optimal policy, starting from state x. Theorem 1 describes the optimal abatement and restoration policies, and the resulting path of resource quality. It identifies two key quality levels: x, the restoration trigger; and x † , an inflection point in the value function that coincides with maximum abatement. 10 (Proofs of theorems may be found in Appendix A.) Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then, there exist states x and x † with x < x † such that the following statements hold:
11. there is a function a * : (x, ∞) 7 → [0, a] such that for every x ∈ (x, ∞), a * (x) uniquely attains the supremum in equation (2); 12. a * is increasing on {x ∈ (x, x † )|a(x) 6 = a} and decreasing on {x ∈ (x † , ∞)|a(x) 6 = a}; and 13. letting R * = (−∞, x], the pair (a * , R * ) is an optimal policy. Figure 1 illustrates optimal abatement and restoration policies. 11 Quality is plotted on the horizontal axis. The optimal abatement rate as a function of quality, a(x), appears above the axis, with the corresponding values of the value function J below. (Note that the units differ on the positive and negative segments of the vertical axis.)
Under the optimal policy, the manager restores the resource whenever environmental quality falls to x. At states above x, the manager abates the new flow, at a specified rate that varies with the current quality of the resource. How fast or slowly the manager lets quality decline depends on abatement. After restoration occurs, environmental degradation resumes, environmental quality starts to decline (albeit stochastically), and the cycle repeats. 12 
Optimal restoration
The optimal restoration of an environmental resource resembles the familiar solution to the classic inventory problem: a profit-maximizing firm will follow an (S, s) rule in managing its inventory, drawing its stock of goods down until some level s is reached and then replenishing the inventory up to the level S (Arrow, Harris, and Marschak 1951; Scarf 1960). The "inventory" in the restoration case is the level of a resource's environmental quality, and a restoration corresponds to a replenishment of inventory.
To see how the possibility of abatement affects optimal restoration, consider the case in which only restoration is feasible. (This case is formally equivalent to the model above with the abatement ceilingā set at zero.) Because the absence of abatement as an option constrains the manager's actions, the value function in the restore-only case must be everywhere less than the value function in the combined abate-and-restore case. In other words, the availability of abatement makes the resource more valuable, because its deterioration can be slowed. Figure 2 illustrates this result.
While introducing abatement raises the value function at every state, the magnitude of the shift is not the same everywhere. Thus the feasibility of abatement changes the slope of the value function. An immediate implication is that introducing abatement may change the optimal 11 The functional forms and parameter values used for all figures are provided in Appendix B. 12 In some real-world cases, restoration is done only once, after which the process of environmental degradation stops. While our model does not explicitly consider such one-time-only restorations, the implications of the model are reasonably clear for such cases: we abate at the margin (if possible) and then restore all at once. In other words, we maximize up until the first restoration, and then eliminate new flows after that. In order for one-time restoration to be optimal, however, there would presumably need to be a nonconvexity in benefits, or at least very high marginal damages from the first few units of degradation.
Note that some cases that might appear to involve "one-time only" restorations may, in fact, simply be combined abatement-restoration policies in which the abatement policy is designed to maintain a fairly high level of environmental quality, implying that the probability that the resource quality declines far enough to trigger restoration is very small. For example, a manager who cleans up a river may not expect to do so again. That expectation, however, is based not on a complete cessation of damages at all cost, but rather on an attempt to maintain a high river quality. The possibility remains -however slight -that unforeseen changes in water currents or waste generation will create the need for future restorations. restoration trigger. To see why, recall that restoration occurs at the state where the value function equals J(0) − C. Consider what happens as quality worsens from x = 0. The steeper is the value function below x = 0, the sooner it will have declined by enough to make restoration worthwhile. Figure 2 presents a case in which introducing abatement raises the optimal restoration trigger. At first glance this result may seem counterintuitive: why are not restoration and abatement always substitutes for each other? The reason is that introducing abatement may raise the value function more at high levels of quality than at low levels. When quality is high, restoration is distant, and abatement allows the manager to maintain quality at a higher level than would be possible in its absence. Hence introducing abatement may raise the value function more at high levels of quality than at low levels. If so, the restoration trigger must rise.
Different circumstances, however, can produce the opposite result. Simulations demonstrate that the availability of abatement lowers the restoration trigger for some parameter values, e.g., when mean flow is sufficiently low. The precise conditions under which the trigger falls or rises are difficult to determine, and remain an open question for future research.
Optimal abatement
As environmental quality declines from its high initial level, the optimal rate of abatement first increases, but then falls as quality approaches the "trigger" level x. This optimal abatement path has an intuitive economic interpretation. As the trigger point x nears, the marginal benefit of abatement diminishes, since the quality of the resource will be restored soon anyway. 13 At each level of quality x, the choice of abatement must achieve the supremum of the fundamental equation of optimality (2) . Ignoring terms that are functions only of the state x, the abatement rate must attain the supremum of a function f x (a) = aJ 0 (x) − c(a). The first term, aJ 0 (x), represents the rate at which the value function increases. This corresponds roughly to the expected benefit from abating at rate a, taking into account present and future utility. 14 The second term, c(a), represents the cost of abatement a. Hence the optimal policy at each state sets the abatement rate to maximize the resulting "expected net benefit."
Given the concave utility function, the marginal benefit from abatement at first increases as x diminishes. Since the marginal cost of abatement depends not on environmental quality, but only on the amount of the flow abated, the optimal rate of abatement rises. At a certain point, however, the optimal abatement path reverses course, with abatement decreasing as quality continues to worsen. This transition point occurs precisely at the inflection point x † identified in Theorem 1. Above x † , the value function is concave, so that the marginal benefit of abatement increases as the state worsens. Below x † , however, the value function is convex: thus the marginal abatement benefit diminishes as x continues to decrease. Since abatement cost is independent of the state, the abatement rate reaches its peak where the marginal benefit of abatement is greatest.
Note that the abatement rate falls all the way to zero at the restoration trigger point x. This follows from the continuity of the first derivative of the value function, J 0 (x), known as the "smooth- 13 This and subsequent heuristic explanations are less technically rigorous than the theorems themselves. These discussions aim to connect our formal results to more familiar results from economics. Intuition's gain is occasionally rigor's loss.
14 Heuristically, for a given marginal change in the state dx, the resulting change in the value function would be J 0 (x)dx. Abatement a, carried out over an infinitesimal time period of duration dt, yields a marginal improvement in the state due to abatement dx = adt. We can think of (adt)J 0 (x) as the resulting change in the value function (over an infinitesimal period of time). Dividing through by dt yields the rate of change in the value function, aJ 0 (x).
pasting" condition (Krylov, 1980) . Because restoration will take place at any x < x, and restoration cost is unaffected by the starting-point, the value function J(x) is constant below x. In other words, abatement brings zero marginal benefits at the restoration point x, because the state will be restored to x = 0 immediately. The smooth-pasting condition requires that as the state approaches the trigger, the marginal benefits from abatement decline smoothly to zero. Marginal cost must follow suit, implying that abatement must go to zero as well. 15 We can establish a further result on the shape of the abatement path. Recall from Theorem 1 that abatement increases as environmental quality falls, down to the state x † , before declining as the trigger approaches. Evidently, if the abatement rate rises high enough, it will reach the average flow rate µ. Suppose this condition obtains, and let x * denote the highest quality level at which a(x * ) = µ. (See Figure 1. )
We call x * an expectation equilibrium: since abatement at x * equals the expected flow, the quality level will remain there in expectation. Moreover, x * is locally stable. Starting from x * , a "high" flow of damages (at a rate greater than µ) will depress environmental quality below x * . In response, abatement will increase, so that a * (x) > µ. Thus the quality level will return to the target x * in expectation. A "low" flow of damages will raise quality above the target level, leading to a slackening of abatement efforts and a tendency back toward x * .
Because a declines to zero as the trigger level approaches, there must be a second state x * * < x * at which optimal abatement again equals the average flow rate. This too is an equilibrium, but not a stable one: any deviation in flow from µ will tend to push quality either downward toward x or upward toward x * .
Hence when an expectation equilibrium x * exists, it acts as an "attractor" for the quality level, in the sense that quality will arrive at x * and stay there in expectation. Because the optimal abatement path satisfies c 0 (a(x)) = J 0 (x) at all states x, an expectation equilibrium satisfies J 0 (x * ) = c 0 (µ): it occurs at the point where the marginal cost of fully abating expected new pollution (achieving a zero net flow in expectation) just equals the marginal net benefits from doing so. This outcome, of course, is simply the stochastic analogue to the steady-state equilibrium derived in deterministic optimal control models. Nevertheless, if flows are large enough to push quality below x * * , the state will (again in expectation) decline to the restoration trigger x.
While the availability of abatement may make restoration more worthwhile -in the sense of raising the trigger -the feasibility of restoration always lowers abatement. To see this, consider the case in which restoration is not possible. Let J abate denote the optimal value function in this case:
where the supremum is taken over abatement policies. Let a abate be the corresponding optimal abatement policy. Using similar methods as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can show that J abate < 0, that J abate (x) is finite for every x, and that J abate is twice continuously differentiable and concave with J 0 abate unbounded above; moreover, an optimal policy a abate exists and uniquely satisfies the Bellman equation corresponding to the value function J abate . 15 That abatement goes all the way to zero depends on costs being destination-driven. A more general smoothpasting result still holds with more general restoration cost functions, however. If cost is given by C(x) = F + γ(x), with γ 0 < 0, then J 0 (x) > 0 even at quality levels below x, since further reductions in quality raise the cost of restoration. In such a case, J 0 (x) would decline continuously to −γ 0 (x) > 0. Instead of going to zero, abatement would decline smoothly to a satisfying c
Theorem 2 compares the optimal value functions and abatement policies in the abatement-only case with those in the full SFQ case analyzed above.
Theorem 2 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then, 1. there exists a statex such that a abate is decreasing on (x, ∞) and a abate (x) = a for all x ≤x; 2. lim x→∞ a abate (x) = 0; 3. ifā > µ, then there exists a state x * abate such that µ < a abate (x) for x < x * abate and µ > a abate (x) for x > x * abate ; 4. J 0 < J 0 abate ; and 5. for each state x ∈ (x, ∞), where x is the trigger point under restoration, either a(x) < a abate (x) or a(x) = a abate (x) = a.
The first three assertions characterize the optimal abatement path in the absence of restoration. 16 Note that abatement rises monotonically as quality diminishes, up to the abatement ceilinḡ a. One consequence is that an expectation equilibrium always exists in the abatement-only case, as long as the abatement ceiling is higher than the mean flow rate (Assertion 3).
Assertion 4 states that the derivative of the value function -the marginal increase in the present value of net benefits as the resource's state improves -is everywhere less in the abate-and-restore case than in the abate-only case. The feasibility of restoration raises the value function everywhere, since its absence represents a constraint on the resource manager. But the value function increases more at low levels of quality, where restoration is imminent, than at high levels of quality, where restoration is more distant. The final assertion establishes that the optimal abatement rate when restoration is available is less than in the abate-only case, unless the abatement ceiling is binding. This result follows directly from Assertion 4. When restoration is possible, the present value of net benefits (i.e., the value function J(x)) increases more slowly as the state improves. Loosely speaking, the marginal gains from abatement are lower. Hence less abatement is performed.
A corollary of Assertions 3 and 5 is that even if an expectation equilibrium exists when restoration is feasible, it must occur at a lower level of quality. That is, x * < x * abate . Thus the availability of restoration alters the optimal abatement policy, even when the probability of its occurrence is very low. Figure 3 summarizes this discussion, portraying optimal abatement policies with and without the possibility of restoration. In the top panel, an expectation equilibrium exists when restoration is available, but it occurs at a lower level quality than if restoration were not an option. 17 The bottom panel of Figure 3 illustrates a case in which restoration has a more drastic consequence for the abatement path. No expectation equilibrium exists: at all values of x above x, abatement merely slows -but never halts -the net flow of damages. Rather than maintaining quality at a certain level, the optimal policy lets damages accumulate until the trigger level is reached, and then restores the resource. Which of the two cases portrayed in Figure 3 prevails depends on how fast the resource deteriorates, as we discuss in the next section. 18 
Comparative statics
In this section, we consider how the optimal policies just described vary with the mean and variability of the flow rate as well as with the costs of restoration and abatement.
Flow rates
When both abatement and restoration are feasible, whether an expectation equilibrium exists depends on how fast quality deteriorates. Figure 4 illustrates optimal abatement policies for three values of the drift rate µ. Note that the vertical axis measures the fraction of mean flow abated, so that the abatement rates are normalized by the flows. 19 An expectation equilibrium exists only when flows are low. When the mean flow rate is high, the cost of offsetting it with abatement is high as well. At the same time, high flows mean that restoration will be more frequent, on average, so that damages will persist in the environment for a shorter period of time before being cleaned up. Hence at higher flow rates, restoration becomes more attractive relative to abatement. Figure 5 shows more directly how the importance of abatement relative to restoration varies with the flow rate. The horizontal axis measures the flow rate. The vertical axis measures the time-averaged rate of abatement as a fraction of the flow of damages, or (equivalently) the fraction of total damages that is cleaned up optimally by abatement rather than restoration. Thus for a given flow rate, the height of the curve represents the fraction of cleanup due to abatement. The remainder of the cleanup, from the curve to the top of the graph, is due to restoration. For example, at a flow rate of 3, approximately 20% of the total flow of damages is cleaned up by abatement, with the remaining 80% cleaned up through periodic restorations. Figure 5 also illustrates how the existence of an expectation equilibrium depends on the flow rate. For flow rates to the left of the dotted vertical line, an expectation equilibrium exists. At higher flows, to the right of the line, no expectation equilibrium exists.
If flows are low, abatement offsets expected flows completely over some range, so that an expectation equilibrium is reached. In this case restoration occurs with very small probability, and virtually all of the damages are cleaned up through abatement. For low flow rates, then, we may say that abatement is the "principal strategy." As flows increase, the fraction of flow abated drops dramatically, and restoration becomes the principal strategy.
Whether cleanup relies more on restoration or abatement determines how the quality of the resource varies over time. Figure 6 plots the frequency distributions of states for the three flow rates used in Figure 4 . When flows are low, an expectation equilibrium is achieved. States close to this equilibrium level are much more common than other states, as shown by the peak of the frequency distribution. At somewhat higher flow rates, no expectation equilibrium exists, and restorations occur more frequently. As a result, high-quality states become more common. Nonetheless, since less abatement occurs when the quality of the resource is high, the most common states are those somewhat above the restoration trigger, producing a peak in the frequency distribution. At a high abatement function is tangent to the horizontal line at µ. The resulting "expectation equilibrium" x * is then stable from the right but not the left. For x > x * , abatement will be lower than µ and the state will tend to return to x * . For x < x * abatement will also be less than µ, implying that in expectation the quality level will decline to the trigger level for restoration. 19 The focus of our discussion is on the fraction of flow abated, which clearly reaches a higher peak at low flow rates than at high ones. As Figure 4 shows, the peak of the abatement function may also be higher in absolute terms when flows are low. At a flow rate of 3, for example, abatement rises to roughly one quarter of the flow rate, or 0.75 in absolute terms. At µ = 1.0, on the other hand, abatement exceeds 1.6 in absolute terms.
flow rate, restoration becomes more important relative to abatement. As a result, all states between the initial quality level and the restoration point occur with roughly equal frequency. Figure 6 also demonstrates a seemingly paradoxical result: in the full SFQ case, when both restoration and abatement are possible, the average quality of the resource may sometimes be higher when flows are greater. When this does occur, the reason is that restorations are more frequent when the flow of damages is high, so that high-quality states are more common.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the value of the resource at every quality level, J(x), is lower when flows are higher. Higher flows mean greater deterioration in the resource, and hence bring both lower utility and higher cleanup costs. The following theorem summarizes this point. The proof is straightforward and hence omitted.
Theorem 3 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Let J(·, µ) be the optimal value function given a drift rate µ > 0. Then, for any x, J(x, µ) is decreasing in µ.
Variability
Figure 7 depicts optimal abatement paths for three variance rates, at two mean flow rates. Note that abatement reaches a higher maximum when the variability is lower (the solid lines in the figures). This is a consequence of Jensen's Inequality. Because abatement costs are convex, abatement becomes more expensive in expectation as the variability rises. Hence the effect of variability on the balance of cleanup strategies is similar to that of the flow rate: the share of cleanup that should be done by abatement falls as the variability rises.
The effect of variability on the value function is ambiguous. We can, however, determine the role of variance when only one of the cleanup options is feasible. It is straightforward to show that when only abatement is feasible, the value function J abate is decreasing in σ 2 . In that case, the value function is concave everywhere: hence by the usual Jensen's Inequality arguments an increase in variance lowers the value of the resource in expectation. This result is stated in the following theorem, the proof of which is omitted.
Theorem 4 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Let J abate (·, µ, σ 2 ) be the optimal value function given the variance rate σ 2 , when only abatement is feasible. Then, for any x, J abate (x, µ, σ 2 ) is decreasing in σ 2 .
In the restoration-only case, on the other hand, the opposite result holds, as long as the resource manager is sufficiently patient. That is, J restore is increasing in σ 2 for small enough values of the discount rate α. In this case, the value function is convex near the restoration trigger, so the Jensen's Inequality argument no longer holds. Rather, the intuition behind the result is the following. At any point in time, we are likely to have restored the resource more often leading up to that point when flows are more variable, since the restoration threshold is more likely to have been crossed. Hence the greater the variance, the more likely is the resource to be at a high level of quality. If the discount rate is sufficiently low, this exchange of more numerous cleanups for higher quality raises the present value of expected utility.
Theorem 5 Let Assumptions 1 and 3 hold. Let J restore (·, σ 2 , α) be the optimal value function given variance rate σ 2 and discount rate α, when only restoration is feasible. Then, for any x, there exists a scalar α > 0 such that for any α ∈ (0, α), J restore (x, σ 2 , α) is increasing in σ 2 .
We conjecture that this theorem extends to the case with both restoration and abatement, but have not been able to prove the result.
Effects of flow rate and variability on the restoration trigger
In Figure 7 , the restoration trigger for each abatement path is the point at which abatement falls to zero. In both panels of the figure, the restoration trigger is lower when flows are more variable. Figure 8 plots the restoration trigger against the flow rate µ and the variability σ 2 , for a certain range of parameter values. The top two panels represent two-dimensional projections, showing how the trigger varies with one parameter or the other. (Note that µ decreases from left to right in the top left panel, for consistency with the view in the bottom graph.) The lower panel shows the three-dimensional surface over the same range. The restoration trigger is measured on the vertical axis; notice that µ increases "into" the page, while σ 2 increases from left to right.
For the parameter values in these simulations, the restoration threshold falls monotonically when variability increases. For example, when µ = 5 the trigger point x declines smoothly from −263 to just under −270 as σ 2 increases from 1 to 100. We offer a heuristic explanation for this result, borrowing from the theory of real options. 20 Recall from Theorem 1 that the value function is convex just above the restoration trigger, and flat below it. Since the rate of deterioration is stochastic, and restoration is an irreversible investment, there is an option value to waiting before restoring. Just above the trigger, a favorable shock will raise quality and expected utility: a reward to waiting. The "downside risk," however, is limited, since the cost of restoration is unaffected by quality. This option value is greater when flows are more variable; for high flow rates, the increase in the reward to waiting leads to a lower restoration trigger.
This result may not hold at all flow levels, however. In particular, for low flow rates (not shown in Figure 8 ) an increase in variability appears to raise, not lower, the restoration trigger. One important condition in both cases may be whether expectation equilibrium exists. At low flows, an expectation equilibrium interrupts the decline of quality towards the restoration trigger, and as a result may alter the relationship between flows and restoration. We conjecture the following: if an expectation equilibrium does not exist, the restoration trigger is monotonically decreasing in the variability of flows. 21 We have not yet been able to establish this result analytically, however.
The effect of the flow rate µ on the restoration trigger appears to follow a similar pattern. In Figure 8 , the trigger rises as mean flow falls, down to µ = 1.5. Below that point, the trigger falls with further decline in the flow rate; indeed, the drop is precipitous from µ = 1.0 to µ = 0.5 (not shown on the figure). We conjecture that whether the restoration trigger increases or decreases in the flow rate depends on whether an expectation equilibrium exists.
In both these cases, deriving formal results remains an interesting problem for future research.
Cost
An increase in abatement cost lowers the optimal abatement rate and reduces the value of the resource at every level of quality (a(x) and J(x) decrease). Consider a situation in which an expec-20 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a thorough discussion of option value in the context of dynamic stochastic models of investment under uncertainty. 21 Our conjecture is a statement of sufficiency, not necessity. Simulations show that the trigger falls with variability even in some cases with expectation equilibria. Indeed, for the lowest flow depicted in Figure 8 (µ = 1.0), an expectation equilibrium exists for almost all the entire range of σ 2 .
tation equilibrium exists. As abatement cost rises from this initial level, the expectation equilibrium will occur at lower levels of quality and eventually will cease to exist. The consequences for the optimal restoration policy, however, are less direct. In fact, the relationship between abatement cost and the restoration trigger x is not generally monotonic. We can establish a result on the effects of restoration cost, however. As the cost of restoration increases, the trigger level x decreases. As intuition would suggest, a higher cost increases the incentive to delay restoration.
Theorem 6 Let x(C) denote the trigger level for a given restoration cost C > 0. Then x(C) is decreasing in C.
While we have assumed that costs are destination-driven, the results of the model hold for cost functions exhibiting less extreme economies of scale. For example, suppose that the cost of restoring the resource to state 0 starting from quality level x is given by C(x) = F + γ(x), with F a fixed component of cost and γ(x) a decreasing function of x (i.e., the restoration cost increases with the amount of restoration done). Unless J(0) − J(x) < C(x) for all x, restoration will be optimal for at least one state x. If we now let x denote the highest value of x at which restoration is optimal, then the system will evolve much as in the case with only a fixed cost. 22 
SFQ problems in the environmental arena
In this section, we explore the implications of our theoretical model for the management of resource stocks in the real world. We consider the case of the California condor in detail. An SFQ analysis suggests that the population of condors was allowed to fall far below the point at which it should optimally have been restored. That basic conclusion holds for a wide range of utility and cost parameters. Indeed, under reasonable assumptions the efficient policy would have strived to achieve an expectation equilibrium population of a few hundred wild condors. After discussing the condor case, we briefly sketch the model's application to a range of other environmental examples.
California condor restoration
One of the most prominent efforts at endangered species restoration has been the successful recovery of the California condor (Gymnogyps californianus). With a wingspan of nine and a half feet, the condor is the largest bird in North America. Until the mid-nineteenth century the condor's range extended as far north as the Columbia River Gorge and south into Baja California. 23 Throughout the twentieth century the population declined precipitously; in crisis years, it fell from approximately 100 birds in the 1940s to 22 in 1982. The decline appears to have been due to reduced reproduction (perhaps a result of DDT) and to human-created mortality, including lead poisoning from bullets in game carcasses, shooting of the condors themselves, and hazards from man-made structures such as powerlines. 22 If γ(x) is convex, the restoration policy may no longer be a convex set; but the evolution of the system will be similar because restoration will be triggered each time the state hits x. (If γ(x) is concave, then R will be a convex set as before.) When γ(x) is convex, the extent of scale economies will clearly depend on the relative size of the fixed cost F, and will determine how far the state falls before restoration is undertaken. 23 The diaries of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark report several sightings of the "Buzzard of the Columbia" in 1805 and 1806.
The condor received specific protection under California law as early as 1953, and was recognized as "endangered" by the Federal government in 1967. A federal recovery plan approved in 1979 recommended captive breeding of condors to aid recovery, although it anticipated maintaining a wild population at the same time. After a disastrous winter of 1984-85, when six of the remaining fifteen wild condors died, the Fish and Wildlife Service decided to capture all of the remaining wild birds for the captive breeding program. The reintroduction program was launched in 1992 with the release of two captivity-born juveniles into the Sespe Condor Sanctuary in Los Padres National Forest. More introductions followed, along with modifications to the methods used to rear birds in captivity and release them to the wild. By October of 2003, the wild population had climbed to 83 birds, including one chick hatched in the wild.
The condor recovery effort beautifully illustrates our model. The captive breeding program itself exemplifies restoration with economies of scale. The costs of captive breeding are largely fixed: the costs of developing a program to capture the birds, maintaining the condor populations in captivity, and releasing condors back into the wild do not change greatly on the margin with the number of birds released.
Abatement measures include the provision of food carcasses such as stillborn calves (to prevent lead exposure); promotion of alternatives to lead ammunition; prohibitions on shooting the condors; protection of suitable habitats; and attempts to limit injuries from powerlines and other human structures. Each of these measures potentially helps slow or offset some portion of the decline in the condor population. Arranging them in order of increasing cost per condor saved, as efficient policy requires, produces an increasing marginal abatement cost curve.
Simulating the optimal management policy for the condor requires estimating the restoration cost, abatement cost, and utility functions. Details of all parameters and functional forms used can be found in Appendix C. We estimated the costs of restoration and abatement using detailed program cost estimates in the Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1996). Recommended actions in the Plan were categorized as related to abatement or restoration. Restoration costs were simply summed (in present-value terms), resulting in an estimate of C = $15 million to restore the population to a size of 300 birds (the target wild population that has been adopted by the Fish and Wildlife Service). For each abatement action, average cost (per condor per year) was estimated taking into account historical rates of decline in condor population and the priority accorded that action by the Service. 24 These unit costs were then arranged in increasing order, and a polynomial cost function was fitted to them. For the expected flow rate in the absence of abatement, µ, we used the average annual rate of decline of the condor population over the decades prior to restoration, based on wild condor censuses.
Benefits of condor protection are much less well studied, and estimates of willingness to pay for condor populations do not exist. To generate utility functions for use in the policy simulation, we drew on two existing contingent valuation studies of willingness to pay (WTP) for the protection of bald eagle populations. Stevens et al. (1991) Boyle and Bishop (1987) found an annual per-capita WTP of $15.34 for a larger population of 300 birds. Next, we divided each of these figures by 10 to yield two further estimates. Finally, we multiplied each amount by the current U. S. Sierra Club membership of 700,000. We thus arrived at four point estimates of total annual WTP ranging from $1.1 million (based on the Boyle and Bishop figure, divided by 10) to $23 million (Stevens et al.) . A concave utility function was fitted to each point estimate, assuming that the willingness to pay for a population of zero birds is zero. 25 Throughout the simulations, we consider only the utility for wild (as opposed to captive) condor populations. Figure 9 illustrates simulated optimal abatement polices for these four estimates of willingness to pay. The solid curves correspond to the two estimates based on the study by Boyle and Bishop; the broken curves correspond to the Stevens et al. study. At the lowest valuation, the simulated optimal abatement path is essentially tangent to the horizontal line at the mean flow rate of 2.9, with the peak occurring at a population of 138 condors. (Abatement rates, like flows, are measured in condors per year.) At higher valuations, optimal abatement exceeds mean flow over a significant range. The "expectation equilibria" occur at populations of 232, 277, and 292 condors.
Of greatest interest are the optimal trigger levels for restoration suggested by the model. Recall that the trigger levels represent the quality level of the resource at which the gain in the value function just exactly equals the cost of restoration. In this context, therefore, restoration is optimal when the present value (discounted expected utility) of the wild condor population falls $15 million below the value associated with the population once restored. The trigger levels in our simulations correspond to populations of 85, 149, 189, and 205 condors. For comparison, the actual condor population in the wild fell to 15 birds before restoration was undertaken.
These simulations are merely illustrative; the utility functions use arbitrary functional forms and rough estimates of willingness to pay. Nonetheless, our estimates are deliberately conservative. The low estimate almost surely underestimates actual willingness to pay, since it assumes that Sierra Club members (and only Sierra Club members) would each be willing to pay only $1.53 annually for a population of three hundred birds. 26 We also use a utility function that exhibits much more rapidly diminishing marginal utility for condor populations than some results in the literature on endangered species valuations have suggested. 27 In the lowest-valuation case, the utility function used implies a maximum annual per-capita willingness to pay -for an arbitrarily large number of wild condors -of $1.75. In the highest-valuation case, annual per-capita WTP would never exceed $37, again for an arbitrarily large bird population.
To explore the sensitivity of our conclusions to the parameter assumptions, we ran Monte Carlo simulations varying three parameters: per-capita willingness to pay, an abatement cost parameter, and the variability of the flow rate. 28 The mean per capita willingness to pay was chosen to be $7.70 for 300 birds, or half of the Boyle and Bishop estimate. The resulting abatement policies are illustrated by Figure 10 , which depicts optimal abatement paths for four draws (out of 222). For the purposes of illustration, we treated the maximum abatement rate, average abatement rate, 29 and restoration trigger as jointly distributed variables, and computed a joint 95% confidence region 25 The functional form used is a negative exponential utility function. As in the model discussed above, much of the range is in negative numbers. In particular, we normalized the utility function so that -300 represented a population of zero condors. For the purposes of exposition, we have simply shifted the horizontal axis to reflect that normalization. 26 The cost of a regular Sierra Club membership in 2003 was $39. 27 For example, Loomis and White (1996) present results of a meta-analysis of studies of willingness-to-pay for endangered species. Their findings suggest a utility function of the form ax b with b = 0.8 -a function that results in WTP estimates for large populations that are orders of magnitude greater than ours. 28 These Monte Carlo simulations are described in detail in Appendix C. 29 For these Monte Carlo simulations, the "average" rate used is simply the average abatement taken over states for which abatement is positive. Note that it is computed over states themselves without taking into account the probabilities of those states being reached. using a Wald statistic based on the estimated variance in the sample. Thus the "mean" or central path in Figure 10 corresponds to the draw with the minimum Wald statistic. The other three curves trace the optimal abatement paths for three cases near the boundary of (but still within) the 95% confidence region: they represent the draw with the lowest peak, the draw with the lowest average abatement rate, and a draw with high values for both peak and abatement rate. Figure 10 shows that the central policy reaches a maximum abatement rate of 3.4 condors per year, with an average of 1.1. That policy exhibits an expectation equilibrium at a population of 246 condors. The policies in the 95% confidence region range from a path that never exceeds 2.7 condors per year to one that rises to an abatement rate of 4.5. The restoration triggers in this confidence region vary from 92 to 193 birds, with a mean of 164. Table 1 Hence our model suggests that the condor population was allowed to fall much too far before restoration was undertaken. Indeed, a farsighted policy might have resulted in a expectation equilibrium population of a few hundred birds, resorting to restoration only if several bad shocks reduced the population far enough.
Other environmental applications
Here we sketch how the SFQ model could apply in a range of other environmental settings. A canonical SFQ problem is the accumulation of wastes at disposal sites or generating facilities. For example, consider the optimal management of municipal solid waste. The environmental quality of a landfill site and the surrounding area diminishes as solid waste accumulates. The flow of waste may be slowed through recycling, composting, or waste reduction. Eventually, the landfill is capped, the site is restored, and quality returns to its initial high level. 30 In a typical scenario, waste diversion remains roughly constant over time, or changes only with changing preferences (i.e., a desire to increase levels of recycling) or prices (e.g., land becomes more expensive, or recycled materials become more valuable). Optimal waste management, on the other hand, would vary the rate of abatement over time. When a landfill is first opened, diversion should be relatively high. That is because waste dumped early will be around for the landfill's entire life. This implies that the discounted expected damages it imposes will be high relative to the damages from garbage arriving later. As the landfill nears capacity, waste diversion should slow, since the waste will impose damages only until the time of restoration, when the landfill is turned into a park. Similar issues, on a different scale, are involved in the management of hazardous wastes. Consider the chemistry department at Harvard University. 31 The department's laboratories accumulate a variety of toxic and reactive substances. Storing such substances on campus heightens health and fire hazards. 32 Removing the wastes for permanent disposal -"restoration," in this contextinvolves economies of scale, reflecting the fixed costs of labor and transportation. Chemical wastes are hauled away in "lab packs": containers are collected from labs and packed in larger drums with wastes of similar types. A 55-gallon drum of corrosive flammable liquids costs $320 to ship; a 30-gallon drum costs $215, and a single 5-gallon container $95.
At least in principle, several methods exist to control the flow of lab waste generated. First, the quantities of chemicals used could be curtailed. Doing so would require less suitable experiments, fewer experimental trials, or greater efforts to prevent spills. Second, laboratories could manage their inventories more efficiently. Forgotten or misplaced stocks of unused chemicals linger on shelves beyond expiration, while new chemical stocks are ordered. Separate storerooms for each lab lead to redundant and excess quantities of chemicals. At some cost, inventories could be combined, or managed to match use more closely. Finally, some fraction of the waste stream could be purified and reused rather than thrown away, albeit at significant cost.
Although some abatement would likely be optimal, little concerted effort is actually made to curb flows. A partial explanation is that until recently, individual laboratories did not pay the costs of disposal, and thus had little incentive to reduce their chemical use. Individual labs recently began to pay a volume-based charge for both solvents and lab packs. Limited experience indicates that the use of chemical wastes is fairly inelastic, suggesting high costs of substantial abatement.
A very different application is the sedimentation of reservoirs. 33 The "stock" in this context is the capacity of the reservoir, which is diminished as sediment flows into the reservoir and accumulates. Dams are commonly designed to have finite lives: the reservoir behind a dam fills up with sediment, until the dam is retired. Retirement is costly in monetary and environmental terms, and often requires the construction of a replacement dam. A range of alternative management strategies exists, however. The amount of sediment flowing into the reservoir can be reduced by soil conservation, reforestation, and other measures in the catchment area; or it can be routed away from the reservoir. Restoration technologies also exist. Retirement and replacement constitutes a form of restoration, and one whose costs are essentially destination-driven. Or, the stock of sediment can be removed directly by siphoning or dredging -activities likely to exhibit economies of scale. Hence our SFQ model applies.
The precise nature of the optimal policy will depend on site-specific costs of stock and flow controls. Nonetheless, the common practice of letting sediment accumulate unchecked before retiring the dam -equivalent to a restoration-only policy -is almost surely suboptimal. At the same time, "sustainable management" that seeks to maintain an equilibrium by relying exclusively on sediment flow control, without periodic restoration (Palmieri, Shah, and Dinar 2001), is equally unlikely to be optimal. 31 We thank Henry Littleboy, Health and Safety Officer (for Harvard's Faculty of Arts and Sciences Office of Enviornmental Health Services), who oversees hazardous waste management in the Chemistry Department, and Dr. Alan Long, Director of Laboratories, for their generosity in answering questions and providing information about hazardous waste management in the Harvard chemistry department.
32 Of course, chemical waste storage and disposal are heavily regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency. For example, existing regulations prohibit the storage of waste longer than ninety days. At Harvard, the constraint does not bind: limited storage space makes more frequent collection necessary.
33 The information about dam sedimentation is taken from Palmieri, Shah, and Dinar (2001).
Our model also applies well to degradation of natural habitats such as the Florida Everglades, where natural features and both healthy and endangered species comprise the stock of environmental quality. In the Everglades, that stock can be restored by large-scale projects that recreate historical water flows and reintroduce native species. Meanwhile, the area's deterioration can be slowed by pollution prevention efforts and by reductions in agricultural and urban water use. Topsoil erosion represents another important application. The fertility of farmlands can be restored, with significant economies of scale, by hauling in new soil. On the margin, soil fertility can be enhanced with fertilizer, while erosion itself can be stanched by methods such as "no-till" farming methods. In all of these cases, the core methodological lesson applies: the optimal policy must take into account optimal flow control and optimal restoration simultaneously.
Applications to physical and human capital
In this section, we sketch the application of our ideas to physical and human capital, and illustrate those ideas with a numerical example.
Physical capital: investment and maintenance
Physical capital is subject to both stock and flow adjustments. Stock adjustments include adding to and replacing capital. Maintenance is the principal mechanism of flow adjustment; it slows depreciation. The optimal control of the quality of physical capital is central to a variety of problems, including the replacement of capital equipment, private investment decisions, and the purchase of durable goods.
Consider the "machine-replacement problem": a machine deteriorates or obsolesces over time and periodically must be replaced. If replacement is the firm's only option, this problem becomes an optimal inventory problem, and an (S, s)-style rule is optimal. When the machine's productivity falls to a certain point, perhaps measured in relation to the quality of a new machine, it is replaced, as various dynamic programming models demonstrate. 34 Similar results arise from general treatments of optimal investment under uncertainty. For the normal case where the resale price of capital equipment is below its purchase price, and future demand for output is uncertain, optimal investment is determined by upper and lower bounds on the marginal revenue product of capital (Abel and Eberly 1994, 1996) . The optimal rule is to purchase capital when the marginal revenue product exceeds the upper bound, and sell capital when the marginal revenue product falls below the lower bound. Between the bounds, investment is zero, and depreciation proceeds apace.
Finally, consider the purchase and maintenance of consumer durables. Let wealth be variable, and assume a cost to adjust the stock of a durable, say a house. Consumers have a desired ratio of house value to wealth, possibly varying with wealth. If wealth moves up or down sufficiently, it 34 See the dynamic programming models of Rust (1987) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993) for this result. Neither paper dwells on the machine-replacement problem. Rust is concerned primarily with deriving an econometric specification to infer the parameters of utility and cost functions of managers from observed replacement patterns. Cooper and Haltiwanger are interested in exploring the aggregate implications of machine replacement across multiple firms. Neither paper incorporates maintenance as a choice variable in the formal analysis.
For surveys of work in the operations research literature on the optimal replacement of deteriorating assets, see Pierskalla and Voelker (1976) and Sherif and Smith (1981) .
becomes worthwhile to incur the transaction costs of selling one's old house, and move into a new more or less expensive one. This problem is examined in detail by Grossman and Laroque (1990) .
In all three classes of models, however, depreciation has been treated as exogenous. The SFQ model brings maintenance into consideration. Its costs are reasonably expected to be increasing on the margin. Moreover, the cost of a new piece of equipment is independent of the quality of the equipment it is replacing. One new wrinkle arises: physical capital may have scrap value. If so, and if the scrap value increases with quality, then the net cost of restoration -the replacement cost minus the scrap value -will vary with quality as well. Our model readily accommodates this case. Let scrap value as a function of quality be given by a function γ(x), with γ 0 < 0 and γ 00 > 0; and let the cost of a new machine be denoted F . Then the scrap value case is identical to the general restoration cost function of the form C(x) = F + γ(x), and our results go through as before. 35 Thus, the analysis above applies. Stock and flow controls should be jointly considered and jointly implemented. Optimal policies for replacing a machine, investing in capital equipment, or purchasing consumer durables cannot be derived independently of the optimal maintenance paths. Indeed, how far the productivity of capital should be allowed to fall before replacement depends not only on how costly is replacement but also on how rapid and variable is deterioration.
Finally, note that our model applies if only the relative quality of capital deteriorates over time, rather than the absolute quality. The downward drift in our model need not be a steady decline in a worker's actual productivity or a resource's quality; it may derive instead from a failure to keep up with a moving benchmark. If technological innovation raises the level of skills required by workers (as well as the level of skills acquired by newly trained ones), or diffusion of a new technology raises the productivity of competitors, a firm faces an incentive to update or upgrade its capital, be it human or physical, just as surely as if the capital itself were deteriorating.
Optimal management of physical capital: An example
A numerical simulation illustrates the application of our model to the management of physical capital. The example extrapolates readily to human capital. Consider a firm that produces output using a single machine at zero marginal cost, and sells output at a constant price of unity. The firm must decide how much to spend to maintain its single machine and when to replace it. 36 At each time t, the firm operates a machine with an output rate y t . As a machine ages, its productivity tends to deteriorate: parts rust, gears wear, and so on. Despite this general downward trend, actual productivity may fluctuate with changes in operating conditions, downtime, operating efficiency, the state of workers operating the machine, and so forth. Thus we model the productivity of an installed machine as a Brownian motion with drift µ < 0. Maintaining the machine at a rate of a costs c(a), a convex function.
At every point in time, the firm can choose to replace its installed machine with a new one at a fixed cost C. 37 The output rate of a new machine purchased at time t is given byŷ t . While technology generally improves over time, the upward path may be impeded. First, the quality of craftsmanship may falter; a key producer may retire or leave the industry. Second, firms have heterogeneous needs. Workers differ from firm to firm, and the quality of other inputs into production 35 See the discussion in Section 3.2.4. 36 A precise description of the model and the parameter values used in the simulation is found in Appendix D. 37 For the purposes of this simulation, we ignore quality-dependent scrap value. Specifying scrap value in this context would require a model of other firms who might purchase a used machine. Note, however, that the replacement cost C could account for a fixed resale value of the components of an old machine -e.g., as scrap metal. may vary. As a result, an older machine may work better than a newer one for a given firm. For any given firm, the productivity of the current vintage will have an upward drift, but in the short term may move down as well as up. Hence we model the productivity of current-vintage machines by a Brownian motion with positive drift, denoted β.
The optimal policy combines maintenance (abatement) with periodic replacement (restoration). We solve this problem numerically for particular parameter settings, provided in the appendix. Figure 11 illustrates a simulation of the results, plotting the paths of y t andŷ t over time under the optimal policy, along with the difference in quality x t ≡ŷ t − y t .
The output of new-vintage machines,ŷ t , drifts steadily upward over time. The optimal policy replaces the machine when its quality falls far enough below that of the new vintage. 38 Each machine replacement is marked by a vertical jump in the firm's output y t . Because depreciation and technical change are stochastic, the time between replacements varies. When deterioration is unusually rapid and the new-vintage machines improve dramatically, replacement comes more quickly. When deterioration and technological advance are swift, replacement comes quickly. If gradual, machines are long-lived.
These simulations also allow us to illustrate how the optimal SFQ policy differs from a policy that relies solely on restoration. Consider the constrained policy in which no maintenance is performed. Figure 12 compares the path of x t under such a policy (dotted line) with the path under the optimal policy (solid line). Note that when maintenance is available, optimal replacement occurs at a higher level of relative quality. 39 At the same time, replacement is less frequent, since maintenance slows the rate of deterioration. 40 For the simulations plotted in Figure 12 , taking maintenance into account -rather than relying solely on replacement -brings sizeable gains. The difference in the value functions at x = 0 under the two policies provides a measure of those gains. For the parameter values used here, initial net present value increases by approximately 25% under the optimal policy, relative to the replacement-only case. Of course, the actual increase in present value from taking maintenance into account depends on the parameters. The absolute and percentage gains are greater, the slower is depreciation. The amount presented here merely demonstrates that the gains can be significant.
Human capital: worker training
From the perspective of the firm, investment in human capital presents an SFQ problem. Workers age, tire, and burn out. In industries with rapid technological advance, workers' skills quickly obsolesce. A firm can train its workers to maintain their productivity, but at some point it may lay off its older workers, or reassign them to tasks where the latest technical skills are less essential and replace them with recently trained workers. In this context training is "abatement" and replacement 38 In general, the firm's output, y t , lags behind, periodically catches up when the firm buys a new machine, and then lags behind again as the installed machine deteriorates and obsolesces. Occasionally, however, the output of the installed machine exceeds that of the new vintage. This could be the case if workers learn from experience how better to operate the installed machine, while changes in the new vintage prove to be of little use for the firm. In such situations, the installed machine should be retained for much longer than would otherwise be the case.
39 As discussed in Section 3.1.1, this result depends on the parameter values: under some conditions, introducing abatement can lower the optimal restoration trigger.
40 Indeed, the maintenance rate under the optimal policy can be seen by the divergence in the two paths of x t in the two cases. Optimal maintenance on a newly installed machine is relatively high, but falls as the machine deteriorates and falls further still as replacement becomes imminent.
-which incurs costs such as severance payments or raised experience-rated unemployment insurance -amounts to restoration.
A firm's optimal investment in its workers is likely to vary over time. The literature on human capital has observed that training expenditures, however financed, should be high early in a worker's career, since the payoffs from this investment will be reaped over a longer period of time (Becker, 1964; Ben-Porath, 1967) . Training near the "trade-in" point should be minimal.
Applying the SFQ model to worker training raises an important (and general) policy implication: where SFQ problems involve multiple decision makers, a global optimization will be required to get the incentives and decisions right. In the case of human capital, the firm views the worker predominantly as an asset, whereas the worker views herself as the source of value. The employer will invest in training to the extent it staves off the various costs of switching to a new worker. But the worker who is forcibly retired might far prefer to keep working. Conceivably, workers' concerns would be adequately recognized if the firm could communicate and commit to particular worker trade-in policies. If not, and if the worker reaps a rent from working at the firm, depreciated workers will be laid off too readily. Hence, wages will have to be higher to compensate, and the firm will suffer from its inability to commit.
The government, an involved third party through its concern for the welfare of its citizens, plus its tax collections, social welfare programs, and social security payments, might prefer that the workers continue as well. If worker training is to be provided optimally, taking account of its effects on labor turnover and retirement, all involved parties should help pay for it. In practice, before the worker gets to the firm she and the government pay for training (schooling); once at the firm, training is financed by the firm and the government (through reduced taxes). Schoolleaving decisions and retirement decisions bring equivalent problems of nonalignment of payers' and beneficiaries' incentives. SFQ models can identify the optimal mix of replacement and training for workers, and help design policies that better produce it.
Conclusion
In a wide range of settings, both stocks and flows can be controlled to improve the quality of a resource -whether a natural resource, physical capital, or human capital. If so, the SFQ model applies. Managing the resource entails curbing the downward drift in quality and periodically replenishing the stock. Cost structures play a key role in our analysis. Abatement is taken to follow conventional convexity assumptions, so that the cost of abatement depends on the magnitude of stanched flow. Restoration, by contrast, is assumed to offer significant economies of scale in the magnitude of cleanup.
Abatement and restoration are interdependent in SFQ problems. The availability of abatement changes the level of quality at which the resource is restored, while the feasibility of restoration reduces the optimal rate of abatement. The optimal policy calibrates the use of these two instruments. If restoration is sufficiently costly, an "expectation equilibrium" may be reached where abatement efforts just offset the expected deterioration of the resource. The greater the flow, the more variable the flow, or the lower the restoration cost, the greater the reliance on restoration.
Government can intervene in many SFQ problems, and must understand the central lesson: that stock and flow controls should be coordinated and implemented jointly when both are feasible. When restoration is an option, maintaining a resource stock at a constant level (by abating flows) will be more expensive than achieving the same present value of expected utility from quality, but allowing quality to vary over time. A policy relying solely on restoration will not only restore too frequently (since deterioration is unchecked), but will also allow quality to fall too far before each restoration (since the optimal trigger rises when abatement is available).
These errors are likely to be relevant to real-world environmental policies that utilize only one cleanup strategy or the other. For example, endangered species laws in the United States allow animal populations to fall to critical levels before government intervenes. Costly and risky restorations, such as the condor restoration currently underway, are one consequence. A preferred policy would seek to stem population decline much earlier, for example by giving landowners incentives to maintain appropriate habitat. Moreover, such abatement activity would attain its maximum while the species population remained moderately high, and would decrease as the population declined and restoration neared. Even where abatement measures have been employed as a complement to restoration, they typically appear only when the situation is already dire. Similarly, environmental policies towards hazardous waste tend to emphasize terminal cleanup and permanent storage (restoration) rather than slowing waste generation. The Harvard example is instructive here, as the university focused almost exclusively on hauling wastes away and largely overlooked methods of generating less.
Regulation of air and water pollution, on the other hand, tends to focus on emissions rather than the resulting quality level in the environment. Where only flows matter, or restoration is unavailable, such an emphasis is optimal. But when pollution accumulates, policies should adjust if restoration becomes possible. For example, imagine that a technology is developed (some time in the future) to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. In such a scenario, optimal abatement of carbon dioxide emissions would fall, and restoration would eventually take place if carbon dioxide levels climbed high enough.
Appendix A Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1 Proof. We have J < 0 because u < 0, c > 0, and C > 0. Furthermore, for each x, J(x) > −∞ because E x £R ∞ t=0 e −αt u(x t )dt ¤ is finite. We have established Assertion 1. Because restoration sets the state to 0 and costs C, J(x) ≥ J(0) − C for all x, and an optimal policy R can be defined to be the set of all x such that J(x) = J(0) − C. Let us establish that any optimal policy R is nonempty -that at some level of environmental quality the manager restores the resource. Assume, for contradiction, that the optimal restoration policy R is empty. Then, we would have
It is easy to see that J would be unbounded below, contradicting the fact that J(x) ≥ J(0) − C.
By straightforward sample-path arguments, it is easy to show that J is continuous and nondecreasing. Hence, there exists a state x such that J(x) = J(0) − C for all x ≤ x and J(x) > J(0) − C for all x > x, establishing Assertion 2. It follows that the restoration component of an optimal policy is given by R * = (−∞, x].
It follows from Theorem 3 on page 39 of Krylov (1980) that J is twice continuously differentiable on (x, ∞) and differentiable everywhere. Furthermore, J satisfies
for all x > x. Hence, Assertions 3, 4, and 5 are valid. It is easily verified by sample-path arguments that J is increasing on (x, ∞), and Assertions 6 and 7 follow. It follows from Assertions 2 and 4 that J 0 (x) = 0. Since J 0 (x) > 0 for all x > x, we have J 00 (x) > 0 on some range x ∈ (x, y) for some y > x. Furthermore, since J is bounded above, J 00 (x) must be negative for some x > x, and by continuity of the second derivative, there is a well-defined minimal inflection point x † = min{x > x|J 00 (x) = 0}, which by definition satisfies Assertions 8 and 9.
Let a function f x be defined for x > x by f x (a) = aJ 0 (x) − c(a). Note that f 00 x = −c 00 ≤ −² for some ². Hence, for any x, the supremum
is uniquely attained by some a ∈ [0,ā]. For each state x > x, let a * (x) be the value attaining the supremum, and note that (a * , R * ) constitutes an optimal policy since the values a * (x) also attain the supremum in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (equation 2). This validates Assertions 11 and 13. Moreover, for any x, y ∈ (x, x † ) with x < y, f 0 y (a * (x)) > f 0 x (a * (x)) = 0, since J 00 > 0 on (x, x † ). Consequently, unless a * (x) = a, we have a * (y) > a * (x). An entirely analogous argument establishes that a * (y) < a * (x) if x † < x < y and a * (y) 6 = a. Assertion 12 follows.
We are left with the task of establishing Assertion 10. Given scalars ∆ > 0 and x > x † + ∆, we define two processes
and
each evolving on [0, τ ], where τ is given by
and note that x t = (x
It is easy to show that τ is finite with probability one.
Define "sample costs" associated with the three processes:
where ω denotes the sample path of the underlying Brownian motion w t . We will show that for almost all ω and any x ∈ (x † , ∞) ,
We consider two separate cases that together comprise a set of probability 1. The first is when x − τ 6 = x † . In this event, we have x − τ = x + τ = x τ > x † , and the desired inequality follows directly from concavity of u and convexity of c.
The second case is when x − τ = x † . Given our assumptions on c , the fact that a * is bounded above, and the fact that J is bounded and twice continuously differentiable on (x, ∞), it can be shown that for any y > x, |a
where the second-to-last expression relies on the fact that J 00 (x † ) = 0 and that x + τ − x † = O(∆) . It follows that for almost all ω and any x ∈ (x † , ∞) ,Ĵ(x, ω) is concave in x. By Bellman's principle of optimality, we have
Hence,
and therefore J 00 (x) < 0 for x > x † . q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. For notational convenience, in this proof we shall writeJ for J abate , and likewise forã. Let f x be defined byf
and letã(x) be the value in [0, a] that uniquely attains the supremum off x . Along similar lines as in the proof of Theorem 1, one can show thatJ 0 (x) > 0, implyingf 0 x (0) > 0. Also recall that f 00 x = −c 00 ≤ −² for some ². Consider the less constrained problem
Sincef 00 ≤ −², the supremum is always attained by some z ∈ (0, ∞). Let b(x) denote the optimum for a given state x. Becausef 0
It is easy to see thatã(x) = min(b(x), a). SinceJ 0 is unbounded below, for any z > 0 there exists a state x such thatf 0 x (z) > 0, implying that b is unbounded above, and therefore, there exists a statex such thatã(x) = a for x ≤x. Assertion 1 follows.
Recall thatJ < 0 andJ 0 > 0, so that lim x→∞J 0 (x) = 0. Hence for any z > 0, there exists a state x such thatf 0 x (z) < 0, implying that lim x→∞ b(x) = 0 and that Assertion 2 holds. The fact that b is decreasing implies that there exists a state x * such that µ < b(x) for x < x * and µ > b(x) for x > x * . Since µ < a by hypothesis, we have Assertion 3.
We now turn to Assertions 4 and 5. As a step toward establishing Assertion 4, we will show thatJ < J. It is easy to see thatJ 0 ≤ J . From Theorem 1, we have J 0 (x) = 0 <J 0 (x). This implies thatJ(x) < J(x). For x < x, we then have J(x) = J(x) >J(x) >J(x). For x > x , on the other hand, the fact thatJ(x) < J(x) follows from our observation thatJ(x) < J(x) coupled with standard sample-path arguments.
Consider two states y and z with x ≤ y < z. By Bellman's principal of optimality (see, e.g., Krylov), we haveJ
where τ is the first time at which x t = y. (The final equality holds because x t > x for t ≤ τ .) Letã be an optimal policy for the case where only abatement is possible. We then have
It follows that J 0 <J 0 , which gives us Assertion 4. Finally, consider Assertion 5. Letf x be defined as above. Recall that for any x, the supremum off x is uniquely attained byã(x). SinceJ 0 > J 0 , for every x > x, we havef 0
). This implies that if a * (x) < a thenã(x) > a * (x). Hence, we have Assertion 5.
q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 5
Proof. Without loss of generality, we will assume in this proof that σ ≥ 0. Recall that damage evolves according to z t = µt − σw t . Consider a fixed restoration thresholdx < 0, which may or may not correspond to the optimal restoration strategy. We introduce some notation to facilitate our analysis. First, we denote the running maximum of damage by m t = max τ ∈[0,t] z τ . The number of restorations carried out up to time t is r t = b−m t /xc. Given only knowledge of z t , the tightest lower bound on r t is r t = b−z t /xc. The state can be written as x t = −z t − r tx . If we carried out r t rather than r t restorations, the state would be y t = −z t − r tx . Let Jx(·, σ, α) be the value function corresponding to a restoration thresholdx. Since x t reaches x in finite expected time and the process regenerates every time it hitsx, it is ergodic. It follows that
where the final term follows from the fact that the expected interarrival time between visits tox is −µx.
We will now establish that lim α↓0 αJx(x, σ, α) is increasing in σ. Note that (x t , y t , r t − r t ) together form an ergodic process. There is a joint stationary distribution over the variables x t , y t , and r t − r t such that if (x 0 , y 0 , r 0 − r 0 ) is sampled from this distribution, (x t , y t , r t − r t ) is a stationary process. Let E ∞ denote expectation with respect to the distribution of this stationary process. It is easy to see that, for any t, the marginal distribution (with respect to the stationary process) of y t is uniform over [x, 0] . We therefore have
Note that, conditioned on z 0 and z t , the process z τ forms a Brownian bridge on τ ∈ [0, t]. A sample path argument shows that for any γ > max(z 0 , z t ), Pr{m t ≥ γ|z 0 , z t } is increasing in σ. It follows that for any γ > max(z 0 , z t ), Pr{m t − z t ≥ γ|z 0 , z t } is increasing in σ, and therefore, for any γ ≥ 1, Pr{r t − r t ≥ γ|z 0 , z t } is increasing in σ. Since this holds for all z 0 and z t , and y t is a deterministic function of z t , for any γ ≥ 1 and any y t , Pr{r t − r t ≥ γ|y t } is also increasing in σ. Since u 0 > 0, it follows that
is increasing in σ. It follows that that lim α↓0 αJx(x, σ, α) is increasing in σ.
It is not hard to show that for any x >x and any α > 0, Jx(x, σ, α) is continuously differentiable inx and σ, and we will take this as given. Let x(σ, α) denote the optimal threshold as a function of σ and α. It can be shown that x(σ, α) is continuously differentiable in σ, and we take this as given as well. It follows that
Since x(σ, α) maximizes Jx(x, σ, α) overx ∈ <, we have
We have already shown that, for any x and σ > 0, lim α↓0 αJx(x, σ, α) is increasing in σ. It follows that, for any x and σ > 0, there exists some α > 0 such that for all α ∈ (0, α),
and therefore ∂J restore (x, σ, α) ∂σ¯σ=σ > 0.
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Let J(x, C) denote the optimal value of state x given a restoration cost C > 0. It is easy to show by a sample path argument that for any x, J(x, C) is decreasing in C. Fix C 2 > C 1 > 0 and assume for contradiction that x(C 2 ) ≥ x(C 1 ). Let τ = inf{t|x t = x(C 2 )}. We then have
It follows that
where the final inequality relies on our assumption that x(C 2 ) ≥ x(C 1 ). Theorem 1 asserts that for any C > 0, J(0, C) − J(x(C), C) = C. Inequality 6 therefore implies that C 2 < C 1 , which yields a contradiction.
Appendix B Numerical simulations in Section 3
The computations that generated Figures 1-8 in Section 3 were conducted using a quadratic function for abatement cost and a negative natural exponential function for utility. The functional forms and most of the parameter values used are summarized in Table B1 . The flow rate µ is not given in the Value functions were computed via policy iteration on a "locally consistent" approximating Markov chain (see, e.g., Kushner and Dupuis, 1992) . Most simulations required only 10 iterations to converge to a solution, although more iterations were used in some cases. Similar methods and functional forms were used for the simulations referred to in Section 3.2. 53 for  300) . Each of these estimates was multiplied by 700,000 -the U. S. membership of the Sierra Club -to yield an estimate of total annual willingness to pay. We assumed that the willingness to pay for zero birds was zero. For utility functions throughout the condor simulations we used a negative exponential function of the form −e −βx+κ , with the scaling parameter κ chosen to exhibit fairly rapid diminishing marginal returns. These assumptions then determined a value of β corresponding to each measure of willingness to pay. In the computations, the restoration point was normalized to be zero, and negative values of x were considered (as in the model of Section 3). For the purposes of analysis, we re-normalized the restoration point to 300 birds, and added the same number to every state in order to represent condor populations as positive numbers.
Restoration cost was determined from the 1996 Condor Recovery Plan (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 1996). The abatement cost function was generated by estimating unit costs for a number of protective actions recommended in the recovery plan and fitting a cubic polynomial to the resulting data. Estimates of the denominator ("abatement rate" or number of condors saved per year) were derived from the priority hierarchy attached to the various protective measures; "1" was the highest priority, "3" the lowest.
The specific functional forms and parameter values used are given in Table C1 . All dollar values are in constant 1996 terms. All costs are expressed in thousands of dollars. The abatement actions, along with their assigned priorities and associated unit costs, are presented in Table C2 . Step up enforcement of relevant laws 5 270 3
Protect habitat on Hopper Mtn. 20 400
Notes: a. Priority accorded abatement measures in the 1996 Recovery Plan from 1 (highest) to 3 (lowest).
Monte Carlo simulations. We performed 222 simulations where the utility parameter β, the cost parameter γ 2 , and the variability σ 2 were the result of random draws from independent normal distributions. The random variables were generated by Matlab's pseudo-random number generator, with each draw representing three randomly chosen variables from ten supplied by the number generator. (In fact, we drew 225 parameter vectors and discarded three with negative values for the parameters; hence the distributions, strictly speaking, were truncated rather than truly normal. However, the truncation seems minimal enough that we can safely ignore its effects on inference from the simulations.) The parameters γ 2 and σ were drawn directly from the distributions given in Table C3 . In the case of β the random parameter was per capita annual WTP, drawn from a normal distribution centered on $7.70, equal to one-half the Boyle and Bishop estimate; this was chosen as a conservative estimate that still allowed ample room for variance. For each draw of WTP, saŷ u, β was computed by using the functional form u(x) = −e βx+5 , setting u(300) − u(0) =û (recall that 300 corresponds to the total bird population that the Boyle and Bishop study was based on), and solving for β. We treated the average and maximum abatement and the trigger level x as three variables, and computed a joint 95% confidence region using the Wald statistic
where θ i is the 3 × 1 vector of the values of the three variables for draw i, θ 0 is the vector of sample means, andV is the sample covariance matrix. The 95% confidence region was the set of draws for which W i < 7.82, the critical value for the χ 2 distribution with three degrees of freedom.
Appendix D Simulation of machine replacement problem
Letting τ i be the ith time at which a new machine is purchased, the production rate for the firm evolves according to y t = y 0 + R t s=0 (q s − µ)ds + σw 1,t − P {i|τ i <t} (y t − y τ i ), where q t is maintenance at time t. The firm's objective is to maximize the present discounted value of expected profit:
This problem can be formulated as a stochastic control problem with state variables y t andŷ t , and the corresponding value function J(y,ŷ) = sup
We can formulate the problem more succinctly in terms of the difference in quality between the currently operated machine and the state of the art. Let x t = y t −ŷ t ; then x t is a Markov process evolving according to
for some standard Brownian motion w t . Note that x t is negative when the old machine is inferior to the new vintage. Define a "differential value function"
V (x) = sup
The difference between V and J does not depend on the state, since V (x) = J(y,ŷ)+E £R ∞ t=0 e −αtŷ t ¤ . Thus the differential value function V captures the relative quality of states as well as J does, and a pair (q t , τ i ) attains the supremum for V if and only if it attains the supremum for J.
Value functions were computed as described in Appendix B. The parameters used are shown in Table D1 . Note that we set the maintenance ceiling equal to µ, which seemed appropriate to the machine-replacement context. While the other parameter values are essentially arbitrary, their relative scale bears some interpretation. If we think of time as being measured in "months," the sum of the mean deterioration rate µ and the mean rate of technological improvement β correspond to a scenario in which an unmaintained machine would be replaced every two-and-a-half years on average. (The trigger level for the no-maintenance case in Figure 12 is x t = −31, while µ+β = 1.0.) 12 were then generated using 10,000 random draws from two normal distributions to represent the realized evolution ofŷ and of y under the optimal and constrained (no maintenance) policies. Naturally, both the optimal and constrained policies were computed using the same set of draws. 
